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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Cullen R. Sims appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for 
post-conviction relief. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
The state charged Sims with felony eluding, aggravated felony DUI, felony 
possession of a controlled substance, and misdemeanor resisting and 
obstructing an officer. (R., pp. 68-70.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Sims pied 
guilty to the aggravated DUI charge and the state dismissed the other charges. 
(R., pp. 71-73.1) 
Sims filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging, among other things, 
that his counsel was ineffective for not filing a motion to suppress evidence of his 
blood draw. (R., pp. 4-6.) In his affidavit Sims asserted his blood "was taken 
from me and given to the police" without his consent or a warrant. (R., p. 10.) 
He further stated, "If the Motion to suppress would have prevailed, I would not 
have entered into the plea of guilty." (R., p. 11.) Sims also asserted he 
requested his attorney to move to suppress the evidence but the attorney told 
him such a motion would be without merit. (R., p. 11.) 
The state moved for summary dismissal of the petition on the basis that it 
was unsupported by admissible evidence sufficient to show a viable claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. (R., pp. 101-04.) The district court granted 
1 A more detailed factual and procedural history is set forth in State v. Sims, 2014 
Unpublished Opinion No. 626 (Idaho App., July 17, 2014), a copy of which is 
attached to this brief as an appendix for the Court's convenience. 
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partial summary dismissal, dismissing the claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. (R., pp. 108-120.) 
The district court denied the remainder of the petition after an evidentiary 
hearing. (R., pp. 125-131.) Sims filed a notice of appeal timely from the final 
judgment. (R., pp. 132-135.) 
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ISSUE 
Sims states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err in dismissing Mr. Sims' petition for 
post-conviction relief without conducting an evidentiary hearing on 
his claim that his trial attorney failed to consult with him and file a 
motion to suppress the results of the warrantless, non-consensual 
blood draw conducted upon him? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 4.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
Did Sims fail to present admissible evidence supporting a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel? 
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ARGUMENT 
Sims Failed To Present Evidence Supporting A Prima Facie Claim Of Ineffective 
Assistance Of Counsel 
A. Introduction 
The district court dismissed the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
for failing to file a motion to suppress because "the allegations are generally 
stated and not supported by material facts or are merely conclusory" because 
Sims alleged that a motion to suppress the blood test should have been filed but 
did "not provide additional detail, facts, or evidence as to the basis for filing such 
motion, or if filed, how the motion would have been successful." (R., p. 112.) On 
appeal Sims "asserts that the district court erred in dismissing his claim that his 
attorney was ineffective for failing to discuss the ramifications of [Missouri v. 
McNeely, 133 S.Ct. 1552 (2013),] move to withdraw his guilty plea, and file a 
motion to suppress." (Appellant's brief, p. 5.) There are several significant flaws 
in this argument, namely that Sims never claimed his attorney was ineffective for 
failing to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and his claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel for not filing a suppression motion is not supported by 
evidence. Application of the relevant legal standards to the record in this case 
shows the district court correctly granted summary dismissal of this claim. 
B. Standard Of Review 
In reviewing the summary dismissal of a post-conviction application, the 
appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact 
exists which, if resolved in petitioner's favor, would require relief to be granted. 
4 
Nellsch v. State, 122 Idaho 426, 434, 835 P.2d 661, 669 (Ct. App. 1992). The 
court freely reviews the district court's application of the law. ~ at 434, 835 P.2d 
at 669. The court is not required to accept either the applicant's mere conclusory 
allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions 
of law. Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001). 
C. Sims Presented No Evidence Of Deficient Performance Or Prejudice 
"Idaho Code § 19-4906 permits a court to rule summarily on applications 
for post-conviction relief." Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 
803 (2007) "A court may grant the motion of either party under I.C. § 19-
4906(c), or may dismiss the application sua sponte under I.C. § 19-4906(b)." ~ 
Summary disposition of a post-conviction petition "is appropriate if the applicant's 
evidence raises no genuine issue of material fact." ~ at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 
(citing I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c)). "To withstand summary dismissal, a post-
conviction applicant must present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to 
each element of the claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof." 
State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. 
State, 134 Idaho 581,583, 6 P.3d 831,833 (2000)). 
In order to prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a post-
conviction petitioner must demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting 
prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); State v. 
Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137, 774 P.2d 299,307 (1989). Where the claim of 
ineffectiveness is failure to make a motion, the "conclusion that the motion, if 
pursued, would not have been granted by the trial court, is generally 
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determinative of both prongs of the [Strickland] test." Sanchez v. State, 127 
Idaho 709, 713, 905 P.2d 642, 646 (Ct. App. 1995). 
Sims presented no evidence that his counsel performed deficiently in not 
filing a motion to suppress. An attorney's performance is not constitutionally 
deficient unless it falls below an objective standard of reasonableness, and there 
is a strong presumption that counsel's conduct is within the wide range of 
reasonable professional assistance. Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631, 634, 718 
P.2d 283, 286 (1986); Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401,406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 
(Ct. App. 1989). "Although the failure to advance an established legal theory 
may result in ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland, the failure to 
advance a novel theory will not." Piro v. State, 146 Idaho 86, 91-92, 190 P.3d 
905, 910-11 (Ct. App. 2008). Thus, mere failure to anticipate a change in the law 
will not constitute deficient performance. Shoger v. State, 148 Idaho 622, 630, 
226 P.3d 1269, 1277 (Ct. App. 2010). 
Sims alleged that his attorney told him, prior to his entry of a guilty plea, 
that a motion to suppress would be without merit. (R., p. 11.) That statement 
was undoubtedly true. At and before the time Sims entered his guilty plea the 
controlling precedent was State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 184 P.3d 215 (Ct. App. 
2008). Like Sims, DeWitt was unconscious in a hospital, following a traffic 
accident, when his blood was drawn. 19.:. at 711, 184 P.3d at 217. The Idaho 
Court of Appeals determined the blood draw was reasonable under both the 
exigent circumstances and the implied consent warrant exceptions. 19.:. at 711-
14, 184 P.3d at 217-20. Because the holding of DeWitt would have been 
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controlling, there was no reason at or before the entry of the plea to believe that 
a motion to suppress would have been successful. 
To circumvent the problem that counsel's advice was undoubtedly sound 
at the time it was given, Sims' appellate counsel attempts to effectively amend 
Sims' petition. On appeal Sims asserts trial counsel's deficiency was failing to 
move to withdraw the guilty plea in order to pursue a motion to suppress 
pursuant to Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. 1552 (2013), which was decided after 
Sims' entry of plea but before his sentencing. (Appellant's brief, p. 5.2) That, 
however, was the not the claim Sims asserted in his petition, which makes no 
mention of any motion to withdraw the plea. (R., p. 5.) Likewise, in his affidavit 
Sims contended he "would not have entered" a guilty plea had counsel made a 
successful motion to suppress, but does not allege he would have moved to 
withdraw the guilty plea he entered in order to pursue a motion to suppress. (R., 
pp. 10-11.) Sims' argument that the district court erred by dismissing a claim that 
was not actually presented is meritless. 
Even if the claim that counsel was ineffective for not moving to withdraw 
Sims' guilty plea had been made it is without merit. In State v. Boehm,_ Idaho 
_, _ P.3d _, 2015 WL 774131 (Idaho App., Feb. 25, 2015), the defendant 
moved to withdraw her guilty plea to misdemeanor DUI to pursue a suppression 
motion under McNeely. & at *1. The Court of Appeals was "not persuaded that 
the issuance of McNeely provided a just reason for Boehm to withdraw her guilty 
2 Sims also specifically relies on Idaho Supreme Court precedents from October 
and December, 2014, as the basis for his hypothetical suppression motion and 
motion to withdraw his plea. (Appellant's brief, pp. 10, 13.) These cases were 
decided months after the Idaho Court of Appeals decided Sims' direct appeal. 
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plea" because "McNeely, by itself, did not analyze implied consent." kl at *7. 
Counsel was not ineffective for failing to make exactly the same motion found to 
have been properly denied in Boehm. 
Finally, Sims presented no evidence showing he would have been entitled 
to suppression under any law that existed then or now. The only factual basis for 
Sims' claim is that, while he was unconscious at the hospital, "[his] blood was 
taken from [him] and given to the Police." (R., p. 10.) Sims does not even allege 
any improper state action that would implicate the Fourth Amendment. State v. 
Kopsa, 126 Idaho 512, 517, 887 P.2d 57, 62 (Ct. App. 1994) (it is "firmly 
established" that the Fourth Amendment is not violated by private searches). 
Even if there were state action, and accepting that the blood draw was 
conducted without a warrant or express consent, Sims has not shown the search 
to be constitutionally unreasonable. Although McNeely certainly removes any 
per se exigency argument, it does not prevent the state from showing an 
exigency in fact. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1563 (state may show exigency "in a 
specific case"). Likewise, even if Sims were entitled to application of the Idaho 
Supreme Court's recent decisions on implied consent, such would not prevent 
the state from showing that implied consent was given by the act of driving and 
not subsequently withdrawn. State v. Arrotta, 157 Idaho 773, _, 339 P.3d 
1177, 1178 (2014) (implied consent may be withdrawn). Sims has presented no 
evidence tending to show that these warrant exceptions would not have applied 
in his case. 
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There is no viable claim of deficient performance in this record. Under the 
law in existence at the time of the guilty plea there was no viable basis for a 
suppression motion. McNeely was decided after entry of the plea and would not 
have provided a just reason for withdrawal of the guilty plea. Although McNeely 
did limit the scope of the exigent circumstances exception, it did not address the 
scope of implied consent. Implied consent was not limited by the Idaho Supreme 
Court until 18 months later. Even if Sims were given the benefit of current law 
limiting the scope of both exigency and implied consent, he has failed to present 
any evidence that suppression would have been appropriate. Because there is 
no evidence showing Sims could have prevailed on a motion to suppress at any 
time, much less that counsel elected to not file a suppression motion based on 
an objective shortcoming, there is no viable claim of deficient performance. 
Likewise, there is no evidence of prejudice. When the alleged deficiency 
involves counsel's advice in relation to a guilty plea, "in order to satisfy the 
'prejudice' requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and 
would have insisted on going to trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985) 
(footnote and citations omitted). "Moreover, to obtain relief on this type of claim, 
a petitioner must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain 
would have been rational under the circumstances." Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 
U.S. 356, 372 (2010) (citing Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000)). 
Sims made the naked claim he "would not have entered into a plea of 
guilty" if he successfully suppressed evidence of the blood draw (R., pp. 10-11 ), 
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but neither claimed nor presented evidence that he would have abandoned the 
plea agreement dismissing two other felonies to pursue what was at that time 
(and still is currently) a completely speculative motion to suppress. Moreover, he 
presented no evidence that he would have chosen to go to trial. Because Sims 
presented no evidence of deficient performance or prejudice, the district court 
properly summarily dismissed Sims' claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
The state requests this Court to affirm the district court's order summarily 
dismissing Sims' claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for not filing a motion 
to suppress evidence of a blood draw. 
DATED this 9th day of March, 2~. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 9th day of March, 2015, served a true 
and correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT'S BRIEF by causing a copy 
addressed to: 
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in the State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
KKJ/pm 
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APPENDIX A 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Docll:.ct No. 41078 
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) 
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) 
) 
) 
) 
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2014 Unpublished Opinion No. 626 
Filed: July 17, 2014 Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
CULLEN ROBERT SIMS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED 
OPINION AND SHALL NOT 
BE CITED AS AUTHORITY 
________________ ) 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State ofldaho, Ada 
County. Hon. Lynn G. Norton, District Judge. 
Orders denying motions for credit for time served, affirmed. 
Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Shawn F. Wilkerson, Deputy 
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Lori A. Fleming, Deputy Attorney 
General, Boise, for respondent. 
MELANSON, Judge 
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Cullen Robert Sims appeals from the district court's orders denying his motions for credit 
for time served. For the reasons set forth below, vve affirm. 
I. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURE 
On August 9, 2012, police observed Sims driving and attempted to stop him in order to 
serve him with an arrest warrant for a parole violation. Sims failed to stop, rammed his vehicle 
into a police vehicle, struck another police vehicle, and sped away. While fleeing, Sims collided 
with a third party. The crash resulted in an injury to the third party and an injury to Sims's 
passenger. Sims was transported to a hospital for treatment of his injuries and a possible drug 
overdose. 
On October 17, 2012, the state filed a complaint charging Sims with two offenses--felony 
eluding a peace officer and misdemeanor resisting or obstmcting officers, An arrest warrant 
issued and an officer served Sims with the warrant on November 21, 2012. On January 16, 
2013, the state filed an amended complaint charging Sims with felony eluding a peace officer; 
aggravated driving under the influence (DUI); possession of methamphetamine; felony 
destruction, alteration, or concealment of evidence; and misdemeanor resisting or obstructing 
officers. A magistrate bound Sims over on all but the destruction of evidence charge, and the 
state filed a corresponding information. 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Sims pied guilty to aggravated DUI, LC. § 18-8006, and 
the state dismissed the remaining charges. The district court imposed a unified sentence of 
fifteen years, with a minimum period of confinement of seven and one-half years. The district 
court ordered that Sims receive credit for time served in the amount of 19 I days (starting from 
the date of arrest on November 21, 2012, and ending at his sentencing hearing on May 30, 2013). 
After sentencing, Sims sent the district court a letter requesting credit for 295 days. Sims 
contended officers arrested him for the aggravated DUI on August 9, 2012. The district court 
treated the letter as an I.C.R. 35 motion for credit for time served and denied it. The district 
court reasoned Sims was not arrested until November 21, 2012, and that, although Sims may 
have been in custody on other charges preceding that date, because the arrest \Varrant was not 
issued until October 17, 20 I 2, Sims \Vas at large for at least a month before his arrest. Sims 
thereafter filed another motion for credit for time served and included an affidavit and 
attachments in support thereof. Sims again asse1ted he was arrested for the aggravated DUI on 
the day of the offense (August 9, 2012). The district court found that the evidence submitted by 
Sims did not demonstrate he was incarcerated on the date of the incident. Accordingly, the 
district court denied Sims's motion. Sims appeals. 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The question of whether a sentencing court has properly awarded credit for time served to 
the facts of a particular case is a question of law, which is subject to free review by this Court. 
State v. Vasquez, 142 Idaho 67, 68, 122 P.3d 1167, 1168 (Ct. App. 2005). We defer to the 
district court's findings of facts, unless those findings are unsupported by substantial and 
competent evidence in the record and are therefore clearly erroneous. State v. Covert, 143 Idaho 
l 69, 170, 139 P.3d 771, 772 (Ct. App. 2006). 
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III. 
ANALYSIS 
Sims contends the district court's finding that he \Vas not incarcerated on the date of the 
incident is clearly erroneous. Sims also contends that, although he was served with the arrest 
warrant on November 2 l, 2012, he was actually arrested August 9, 2012, for aggravated DUL 
The state concedes Sims was incarcerated on the date of the incident. 1 However, the state argues 
this incarceration was not attributable to the aggravated DUI charge but, rather, to a parole 
violation in a separate case. 
The award of credit for time served is govemed by LC. § 18-309, which provides in 
pe1tinent pa1t: 
In computing the term of imprisonment, the person against whom the 
judgment was entered, shall receive credit in the judgment for any period of 
incarceration prior to entry of judgment, if such incarceration was for the offense 
or an included offense for which the judgment was entered. The remainder of the 
term commences upon the pronouncement of the sentence .... 
The statute's phrase "if such incarceration was for the offense or an included offense for which 
the judgment \Vas entered" means that the right to credit is conferred only if the prejudgment 
incarceration is a consequence of or attributable to the charge or conduct for which the sentence 
is imposed. Vasquez, 142 Idaho at 68, 122 P.3d at 1168; State v. Akin, 139 Idaho 160, 164, 75 
PJd 214,218 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Hale, 116 Idaho 763, 765, 779 P .2d 438,440 (Ct. App. 
l 989). If a particular period of confinement served prior to the imposition of a sentence is not 
attributable to the charge or conduct for which a sentence is to be imposed, the offender is not 
entitled to credit for such confinement; neither does the sentencing judge err by denying credit 
under such circumstances. Hale, 116 Idaho at 765, 779 P.2d at 440. 
Sims argues the district comt erred because one of the police reports following the 
August 9, 2012, incident contains the following statement, "Sims was then taken into custody for 
felony eluding and his otitstanding felony parole violation." However, an officer's narrative in a 
The district court's finding that Sims was not incarcerated is clearly erroneous. However, 
because we conclude the district court did not fail to award Sims any credit to which he was due, 
remand is not necessary. State v. Pierce, 107 Idaho 96, 102,685 P.2d 837, 843 (Ct. App. 1984) 
(Where a ruling in a criminal case is conect, though based upon an incorrect reason, it still may 
be sustained upon the proper legal theory.). 
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police report is not dispositive of\:yhether Sims's incarceration was attributable to the aggravated 
DUI. Rather, that is a legal determination for this Court to make. The record demonstrates that 
the state did not file a complaint in the aggravated DUI case until October 17, 2012. A warrant 
was issued for Sims's arrest on this same date. Moreover, the record demonstrates officers 
served Sims with the arrest warrant on November 21, 2012. Thus, we hold Sims's incarceration 
could not have been attributable to the aggravated DUI charge until he was arrested on that 
charge on November 21, 2012. 
Sims further contends the district court erred as a matter of law by concluding service of 
an arrest warrant constitutes incarceration. This argument misses the mark. The relevant inquiry 
is whether Sims's incarceration from August 9, 2012, to November 21, 2012, was attributable to 
the aggravated DUI charge. Given that that complaint ,,vas not filed until October 17, 2012, and 
the warrant was not served until November 21, 2012, Sims's argument is untenable. The record. 
demonstrates that Sims's incarceration from August 9, 2012, to November 21, 2012, was 
attributable to a separate, no-bond warrant for a parole violation. 
We recognize that State v. Horn, 124 Idaho 849, 865 P.2d 176 (Ct. App. 1993), may call 
into question the correctness of the credit given in this case. In Horn, the state filed a complaint 
in Ada County charging the defendant with forgery. An Ada County warrant was served on 
Horn at the Gem County jail, where Horn awaited disposition of unrelated criminal charges. 
After disposition, the state transferred Horn to Canyon County to answer unrelated criminal 
charges. The state then transferred Horn to Owyhee County to respond to more unrelated 
criminal charges and thereafter to Elmore County, where even more unrelated criminal charges 
were pending. At the conclusion of the Elmore County case, the state remanded Horn to the 
custody of the Board of Correction to serve his sentence. Approximately 200 days after service 
of the arrest warrant, Horn was brought before a magistrate in Ada County and arraigned. Id. at 
849, 865 P.2d at 176. The magistrate released Horn on his own recognizance. Horn was never 
incarcerated in the Ada County jail in connection with that ,varrant. On appeal, this Court held 
Horn was not entitled to the 271 days that elapsed between service of the Ada County arrest 
'.varrant and sentencing on those charges because Horn was incarcerated in different counties on 
unrelated criminal charges. Id. at 851, 865 P.2d at 178. Thus, the incarceration was not 
attributable to the charge or conduct for which the Ada County sentence was imposed. Id at 
850, 865 P.2d at 177. This Comi forther explained that the determining factor was one of 
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causation--whether the presentence incarceration was caused by the charge for which the 
sentence was being imposed. Id. Pursuant to this analysis, the district court may have granted 
Sims more credit than that to which he ,vas due. However, the state has not cross-appealed the 
decision of the district comt and does not challenge the amount of credit awarded to Sims. 
Therefore, we do not address this issue fmther. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court did not fail to award Sims any credit to which he was due. 
Accordingly, we affirm the district court's orders denying Sims's motions. 
Judge LANSING and Judge GRATTON, CONCUR. 
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